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Abstract: The world’s oceans are
governed as a system of over 150
sovereign exclusive economic
zones (EEZs, ,42% of the ocean)
and one large high seas (HS)
commons (,58% of ocean) with
essentially open access. Many high-
valued fish species such as tuna,
billfish, and shark migrate around
these large oceanic regions, which
as a consequence of competition
across EEZs and a global race-to-
fish on the HS, have been over-
exploited and now return far less
than their economic potential. We
address this global challenge by
analyzing with a spatial bioeco-
nomic model the effects of com-
pletely closing the HS to fishing.
This policy both induces coopera-
tion among countries in the exploi-
tation of migratory stocks and
provides a refuge sufficiently large
to recover and maintain these
stocks at levels close to those that
would maximize fisheries returns.
We find that completely closing the
HS to fishing would simultaneously
give rise to large gains in fisheries
profit (.100%), fisheries yields
(.30%), and fish stock conserva-
tion (.150%). We also find that
changing EEZ size may benefit
some fisheries; nonetheless, a com-
plete closure of the HS still returns
larger fishery and conservation
outcomes than does a HS open to
fishing.
Introduction
The past 60 years have been a tumul-
tuous period for the world’s marine
fisheries. In the early 1950s few stocks
had been exploited heavily; but without
explicit governance, large industrial fish-
eries took hold and systematically overex-
ploited many stocks [1,2]. In 1994 the
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) implemented Exclu-
sive Economic Zones (EEZs) adjacent to
all coastal nations (Figure 1). These
property rights extend 200 nm (,42% of
the ocean) and allow countries to exclude
foreign fleets and exclusively manage
fisheries within their jurisdictions [3,4].
Indeed, for countries with science-based
fisheries management policies, many local
stocks and fisheries contained in their
EEZs are rebuilding [5–7]. But for many
pelagic, migratory stocks such as tuna,
billfish, and shark, the size of the EEZs has
been insufficient to incentivize sustainable
fishing behavior [8–10]. Fish that traverse
multiple EEZs and the high seas ([HS],
,58% of ocean) are overexploited relative
to those contained in a single EEZ [11,12].
This observation accords with two long-
standing theoretical predictions: First, that
open access tends to produce a ‘‘tragedy of
the commons’’ (an unregulated state of
affairs in which individuals inefficiently
compete for a shared, limited resource,
resulting in its eventual ruin [13]), where
fishermen will race to fish, drive stocks
down, and compete away economic value
[12,14]. Thus, we may expect HS stocks to
be overexploited. Second, that spatial
property rights, such as EEZs, will mediate
overexploitation, but only to the extent that
they enclose the full range of the species
[15,16]. If fish migrate [17,18] and/or have
dispersive larvae [19], the ensuing spatial
externality presents a competitive situation
in which countries act like players in a non-
cooperative game [20]. Thus, we may
expect that the more EEZs a stock
traverses, the less likely a sustainable
outcome.When put together, these theories
suggest that migratory species pose perhaps
the greatest global challenge to sustainable
fisheries management [9].
In an ideal world, all nations would
cooperate in the management of trans-
boundary stocks. Indeed for decades hun-
dreds of attempts have been made at multi-
lateral agreements primarily through re-
gional fishery management organizations,
which aim to coordinate fishing across
EEZs and on the HS. While some excep-
tions exist, these efforts are widely regarded
as a failure [12,16,21,22].
Modeling High Seas Closure
It is within this context that we analyze
the alternative of a complete HS closure.
While large marine protected areas
(MPAs) in the HS are of increasing interest
[23–25], a complete closure has not been
proposed, and what little analysis exists
suggests there would be substantial eco-
nomic losses from such a policy [26].
Smaller MPAs, increasingly common and
well-studied in coastal waters [27,28], are
too small to produce significant benefits
for most migratory stocks [26]. Also,
closing only a portion of the high seas
may simply displace fishing effort to other
open-access areas [29], thereby leaving the
problem unsolved. Instead, a complete
closure of the HS may simultaneously
achieve three desirable outcomes: (1) It
acts as a coordination mechanism across
EEZs; (2) it reduces overall exploitation
rates; and (3) it protects a sufficient range
of the stock to allow rebuilding.
The ‘‘risk’’ of closing the HS is that
some species may not range sufficiently far
into EEZs, leaving those stocks under-
exploited. Therefore, we also consider
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changing the size of the EEZs. A key
aspect of our analysis involves modeling
the behavioral competition between coun-
tries for stocks in EEZs and on the HS. To
do so, we adopt a game theoretical
perspective (for estimating the strategic
decisions among interacting players in a
competitive scenario), and use coupled
biological-economic models in which
stocks traverse multiple EEZs and the
HS and the relevant players compete for
fisheries profits. Thus, rather than making
assumptions about exploitation rates we
derive the likely behavioral adjustments
under any given policy.
We model a large range of governance
and biological scenarios that represent the
range of conditions for pelagic, migratory
species in the world’s oceans. Any given
scenario is defined by: (1) the fraction of
the fish stock’s range (and fishery) in EEZs
(the remainder being on the HS); (2) the
number of EEZs traversed by the stock; (3)
the biological parameters of the stock; and
(4) the degree of site fidelity of individual
fish. For each scenario we evaluate three
states of governance of the HS: open
access (‘‘HS open [OA]’’), closed to fishing
(‘‘HS closed’’), or competed for by N
players (‘‘HS open [N]’’). We use a widely
used cost function throughout. Our base-
line model adopts conservative parameter
values, stacking the deck against a HS
closure. As a benchmark we also model
the idealistic case of complete global
cooperation across the entire range of the
stock. Full methods are given in Text S1.
We examined the effects of a HS closure
first with a simple example. Suppose a
reasonably fast-growing stock (r=0.2) [30]
has high site-fidelity (S=0.75), and is
proportionally distributed across the HS
(58%) and ten EEZs (42%). Our model
predicted that when the HS were open, the
ten countries would compete on both the
HS and their EEZs, and drive stocks to a
third of the economically optimal stock size.
When the HS were closed, countries would
compete across EEZs, but no fishing would
occur on the HS: stock increased every-
where (4-fold on the HS and 30% in EEZs),
profit more than doubled, and yield
increased by 42% (though profit and yield
are still only 68% and 84% of their
theoretical values under complete cooper-
ation). The disproportionate increase in
profit is due to interacting effects of
elimination of the inefficient overexploita-
tion on the HS, enhanced coordination
across EEZs incentivized by the spillover
and protection of fish from the HS, and
reduced fishery cost from harvesting a
higher stock density in the EEZs. Collec-
tively, these factors raise profit (and yield)
beyond the loss from not fishing on the HS.
The figures plot various results against
the fraction of the fishery contained in
EEZs. When a fishery is mostly in EEZs,
the problem boiled down to a transbound-
ary one—where an international fish stock
was not contained in any one country’s
jurisdiction. In that case, closing the HS
did not, by itself, fix coordination prob-
lems across nations (Figures 2A and S2),
because escaped stocks still could be
harvested by a competing fishery [9].
Instead, if a fishery is primarily on the
HS, closing the HS eliminated the fishery,
generating a loss. For fisheries targeting
pelagic, migratory stocks, typically some
but not all of the fishery occurs in EEZs
[8,17,18,31,32]. In those cases, closing the
HS nearly always benefited the fishery:
with our baseline parameters, if at least
10% of the fishery were contained in
EEZs, then closing the HS increased
fishery profits (Figures 2A and S2A).
Across the full range of parameters, if at
least 20% of the fishery were contained in
EEZs, then closing the HS increased
profit. The explanation is simple: most
species harvested on the HS are vulnerable
to overexploitation when the HS are
fished, but are likely to recover (and
benefit sovereign fisheries via spillover)
when the HS are closed. As expected,
profits and yields from a HS closure were
never as large as levels achievable under
complete global cooperation of harvest
levels across the HS and EEZs (at best,
they were on average ,60% and ,80%
as high, occurring when ,40% of the
fishery is in EEZs; Figures 2A and S1).
Regarding conservation, a HS closure
always resulted in large increases in fish
Figure 1. Global map of exclusive economic zones (green) and high seas (blue) oceanic areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001826.g001
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stocks (possibly by .100%; Figures 2B
and S2C), consistent with the literature
cataloging the conservation benefits of
marine reserves [28] (but see [29,33] for
counter-examples, particularly in relation
to cumulative impacts and management
challenges in marine ecosystems).
The more EEZs traversed by the stock
(N) the worse was the tragedy of the
commons, and the greater was the per-
centage increase from a HS closure
(Figures 3 and S3). Under typical values
of N (say, N=10–20), the gain was
considerable. If fish are evenly distributed
between HS and EEZs, so 42% are
enclosed in EEZs, then any N.3 scenario
provided benefits, and any N.10 more
than doubled the value of the fishery. In
the extreme, for stocks that traverse 50 or
more EEZs, the gains could exceed 500%.
If the true N is large (say, N=20), but
nations cooperate, the effective N may be
small (say, N=5). Even in that case, a HS
closure increased fishery profit. We as-
sumed relatively high site fidelity
(S=0.75); results were strengthened under
lower site fidelity (Figure S4). All of the
above results held over a large range of
growth rates, though gains from HS
closure were largest for slower-growing
species (Figure S5).
Holding a species’ range constant,
larger EEZs will increase the fraction of
the fishery contained in EEZs (rightward
shift in Figures 2–3 and S1, S2, S3, S4, S5,
S6). Focusing on the blue and red shading
in Figure 2, except for narrow EEZs,
closing the HS typically generated large
gains for both profit and stock (also see
Figure S2). Further, when the HS are
open, the worst possible EEZ width was
around 40%—this width gave rise to the
lowest profit and stock of any possible
configuration of EEZs (on average,
around 25% and 20% of what was
possible for each). Thus the status quo
(open HS and 42% in EEZs) was nearly
the worst case scenario: the HS are
heavily overexploited and countries’ EEZs
are too small to protect stocks from non-
cooperative harvest. Why not simply
extend the EEZs [16]? Doing so entailed
a benefit, but as the EEZs enlarge, the
source of overharvest changed from being
primarily a HS problem to being primar-
ily a transboundary problem. Rather, we
have shown that completely closing the
HS to fishing provided ample protection
to the migratory stocks from transbound-
ary overharvest, and without changing
EEZ size still allowed each country
sufficient space to harvest profitably in
their EEZ.
From Modeling to
Implementation
While our main finding is likely to hold
across many, if not all, ocean basins, there
inevitably will be distributional impacts.
For example, the handful of countries
whose current fishing fleets specialize in
fishing the HS (e.g., Japan, China, and
Spain [31]) may be harmed by the closure.
On the other hand, these countries’ HS
losses may be offset by enhanced fishing
opportunities in their EEZs as stocks
rebuild. Developing countries whose
stocks are depleted by HS over-exploita-
tion but who have not invested in HS fleets
may benefit most from a HS closure.
Thus, for a HS closure to be considered in
practice, it will be important for future
work to explore empirically the fishery and
country-level distributional impacts of this
proposal.
While a complete policy analysis is
beyond our scope, a few comments are
worth noting. Closing the HS to fishing
may seem politically unviable, partly
because UNCLOS recognizes the freedom
to fish there by all nations [3]. However,
UNCLOS also requires ecosystem protec-
tion and equitable and efficient utilization
of the ocean’s resources. Thus, there is
demand for a new legal instrument for HS
governance [34,35]; it could support a HS
closure to meet the UNCLOS equity,
economic, and conservation objectives.
First, gains from a HS closure are
attributable to fish spillover into EEZs,
thus although not fishing in the HS, the
freedom to fish resources from the HS is
maintained. Second, the closure may only
apply to mobile fishery species (and
perhaps over-exploited by-catch species),
and not sessile species (S=1) where fishery
value would be reduced (Figure S4).
Third, a portion of the gains from closing
the HS could be distributed among land-
locked nations in a fashion similar to
existing transfers for transboundary fish-
eries [36]. Finally, although perfect com-
pliance with a HS closure may not be
necessary for gains to emerge (Figure S6),
enforcement is a concern [8,25]. Yet
major advances in fishery surveillance
technology [23], recent increases in the
scope and use of agreements on the HS
(including with MPAs) [8,23,25,37,38],
Figure 2. Fishery and conservation value as a function of high seas policy. Total fishery profit (A) and fish stock (B), as a percentage of the
maximum possible, in relation to percentage of the fishery’s geographic distribution that is within EEZs (i.e., in territorial waters, with the remainder in
the HS), under alternative policies for managing the HS (see legend). Lines indicate the baseline scenario (N= 10, r=0.2, S=0.75, C= 1), and shading
the minimum and maximum values across the factorial evaluation of N=5–50 and r=0.1–0.3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001826.g002
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and perhaps part of the fishery gains due
to the HS closure, could be used to
support its enforcement. Research on the
viability of these options would contribute
substantially to our understanding of the
political and economic feasibility of closing
the high seas.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Fishery value as a func-
tion of high seas policy. Total fishery
yield, as a percentage of the maximum
possible, in relation to percentage of the
fishery’s geographic distribution that is
within EEZs (remainder in the high seas),
under alternative policies for the high seas
(see legend). Lines indicate the baseline
scenario (N=10, r=0.2, S=0.75, C=1),
and shading the minimum and maximum
values across the factorial evaluation of
N=5–50 and r=0.1–0.3.
(PDF)
Figure S2 Gain from closing the
high seas. Percentage gain in total fishery
profit (A), yield (B), and stock (C) from
closing the high seas in relation to percent-
age of the fishery’s geographic distribution
that is within EEZs (remainder in the high
seas). Gains are calculated with respect to
outcomes under alternative policies for the
high seas open (see legend). Lines indicate
the baseline scenario (N=10, r=0.2,
S=0.75, C=1), and shading the minimum
and maximum values across the factorial
evaluation of N=5–50 and r=0.1–0.3.
Horizontal dotted lines are for reference
indicating zero gain.
(PDF)
Figure S3 Gain as a function of EEZ
number. Percentage gain in total fishery
profit (A, B), yield (C, D), and stock (E, F)
from closing the high seas in relation to
percentage of the fishery’s geographic
distribution that is within EEZs (remain-
der in the high seas), and the number of
EEZs that the fishery transverses (N; see
legend). Gains are calculated with respect
to outcomes under HS open (N) (left
panels) and HS open (OA) (right panels)
policies, using baseline values r=0.2,
S=0.75, and C=1. Horizontal dotted
lines are for reference indicating zero
gain.
(PDF)
Figure S4 Gain as a function of
local site fidelity. Percentage gain in
total fishery profit (A, B), yield (C, D), and
stock (E, F) from closing the high seas in
relation to percentage of the fishery’s
geographic distribution that is within
EEZs (remainder in the high seas), and
the level of enhanced local site-fidelity (S;
see legend). S=0 indicates ‘‘common
pool’’ redistribution of fish in relation to
relative patch area. S=1 indicates no
movement of fish among patches. Gains
are calculated with respect to outcomes
under HS open (N) (left panels) and HS
open (OA) (right panels) policies, using
baseline values N=10, r=0.2, and C=1.
Horizontal dotted lines are for reference
indicating zero gain.
(PDF)
Figure S5 Gain as a function of
intrinsic growth rate. Percentage gain
in total fishery profit (A, B), yield (C, D),
and stock (E, F) from closing the high seas
in relation to percentage of the fishery’s
geographic distribution that is within
EEZs (remainder in the high seas), and
the intrinsic growth rate of the fishery
species (r; see legend). Gains are calculated
with respect to outcomes under HS open
(N) (left panels) and HS open (OA) (right
panels) policies, using baseline values
N=10, S=0.75, and C=1. Horizontal
dotted lines are for reference indicating
zero gain.
(PDF)
Figure S6 Gain as a function of
compliance. Percentage gain in total
fishery profit (A, B), yield (C, D), and stock
(E, F) from closing the high seas in relation
to percentage of the fishery’s geographic
distribution that is within EEZs (remain-
der in the high seas), and the level of
compliance with the high seas closure (C;
see legend). C=0 indicates fishing effort in
the high seas is equivalent to the level
under HS open (N). C=1 indicates no
fishing in the high seas. Gains are
calculated with respect to outcomes under
HS open (N) (left panels) and HS open
(OA) (right panels) policies, using baseline
values N=10, r=0.2, and S=0.75. Hor-
izontal dotted lines are for reference
indicating zero gain.
(PDF)
Text S1 Methods.
(PDF)
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Figure 3. Fishery gain as a function of EEZ number. Percentage gain in total fishery profit
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